With the increase of institutional investors shareholding, the institutional investors have more effect on corporate governance, because of this, the asymmetric phenomenon of information and agency costs of listed companies can be improved. Based on the financing constraint model of Almeida, this paper verifies the relationship between institutional investors and financing constraints from the perspective of heterogeneity. The results show that the problem of financing constraints is prevalent in the enterprise. In the non state owned enterprises, the pressure resistant type of institution investors can obviously slow down the financing difficulties, while the pressure sensitive effect is not obvious. In the state owned enterprises, the pressure resistance type and the pressure sensitive type have little or no obvious effect on reducing the financing constraints. Being institutional shareholdings, the securities investment funds, social security funds and QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) have longer holding period and the characteristics of pursuit of long term stable income, so the institutional investors are more willing to participate in internal governance of listed companies and improve corporate governance structure, thereby easing non state owned enterprise financing constraints.