高管股权激励、盈余管理与审计定价——基于盈余管理异质性的视角
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国家自然科学基金项目(71372200);辽宁省教育厅基地项目(WJD201606)


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    摘要:

    使用2009—2013年我国创业板、中小板上市公司数据,基于盈余管理异质性的视角实证检验了高管股权激励与审计定价的关系。通过对盈余管理类型及方向的细分,研究发现,在高管股权激励与审计定价两者关系的传导路径上,真实盈余管理存在部分中介效应,操纵性应计盈余管理间接效应不显著。通过调增方向与调减方向的真实盈余管理,高管股权激励与审计定价分别呈显著负相关、显著正相关关系,说明高管股权激励起到双向作用,并通过真实盈余管理行为对审计定价产生了影响。另外,调减方向的两类盈余管理都与审计定价呈显著正相关关系,说明审计机构更加注重调减方向的盈余管理所带来的风险,从而投入更多的审计资源,审计定价也随之提高。

    Abstract:

    Based on the perspective of earnings management heterogeneity, this paper examines the relationship between top executive equity incentives and audit pricing by using a sample of 2009 2013 listed companies on growth enterprise market and small middle sized board. Based on the analysis of the types and directions of earnings management, it is found that there are some mediating effects on the real earnings management and the indirect effect of manipulative accrual earnings management is not significant in the transmission path between top executive equity incentives and audit pricing. Through the increase and decrease direction of real earnings management, top executive equity incentives and audit pricing appear significantly negative and positive correlation respectively, which shows that the top executive equity incentives plays a two way role and impacts the audit pricing through the real earnings management behavior. In addition, the two types of earnings management in the reduction direction are significantly positively correlated with the audit pricing, indicating that the audit institutions pay more attention to reducing the risk of earnings management, thus invest more audit resources, and audit pricing also improves.

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邵剑兵,陈永恒.高管股权激励、盈余管理与审计定价——基于盈余管理异质性的视角[J].审计与经济研究,2018,(1):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2018-01-09
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