国家审计、审计力度与银行股利政策
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    摘要:

    基于2003年至2016年的上市银行金融审计情况,探讨了在信息传导和治理机制作用下,国家审计对于银行现金股利政策的影响。研究表明,审计行为不但与银行现金股利支付倾向正相关,还显著提升了现金股利支付力度。审计力度的提高则进一步增加了现金股利支付,即审计发现的违规违法问题金额比例越高,现金股利支付力度越大,从而为股利政策的结果模型提供了经验证据。但是审计公告对于银行现金股利支付倾向和支付力度的影响均不显著。此外,按审计类型进行分类研究后发现,进行公告的审计行为以及资产负债损益审计、经济责任审计均与现金股利支付力度显著正相关。研究结果对于提升金融审计影响力,完善审计公告制度,发挥外部治理作用具有一定的借鉴意义。

    Abstract:

    Based on the financial audit of the listed banks from 2003 to 2016, this paper discusses the influence of national audit on cash dividend policy of banks under the effect of information transmission and governance mechanism. The research shows that the audit behavior not only has a positive correlation with the bank's cash dividend payment tendency, but also significantly improves the cash dividend payment. The improvement of audit intensity further strengthens the dividend payment, that is, the higher the proportion of illegal and irregular?practice detected by audit, the greater the cash dividend payment occur, which provides empirical evidence for the “result model” of dividend policy. However, the impact of audit announcements on bank cash dividend payment intention and payment intensity is not significant. In addition, according to the classification of audit types, we find that the audit that would be announced later, the audit of assets and liabilities profits and losses, and the audit of economic responsibility has a significant positive correlation with cash dividend payment. The research results can be used for reference in enhancing the influence of financial audit, perfecting the audit announcement system and giving full play to the role of external governance.

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李 斐,焦跃华.国家审计、审计力度与银行股利政策[J].审计与经济研究,2019,(4):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-07-10
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