韩金红,余珍.纵向兼任高管与企业投资效率——基于“监督效应”和“掏空效应”分析[J].审计与经济研究,2019,(4):
纵向兼任高管与企业投资效率——基于“监督效应”和“掏空效应”分析
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  纵向兼任高管  兼任职务类别  代理问题  中介效应  企业投资效率  企业关联交易  公司治理
英文关键词:vertical interlocks of executives  concurrent duty category  agency problem  mediating effect  enterprises’ investment efficiency  enterprise related transaction  corporate governance
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作者单位
韩金红,余珍 新疆财经大学 会计学院新疆 乌鲁木齐830012 
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中文摘要:
      以2007—2016年A股上市公司为样本,从投资视角考察我国上市公司纵向兼任高管的经济后果。结果显示:当公司存在纵向兼任高管时,其投资效率更高;从兼任者的职务类别分析发现,与总经理担任纵向兼任高管相比,董事长担任纵向兼任高管对企业投资效率的影响作用更显著。进一步探索其作用机制发现,纵向兼任高管同时发挥了“监督效应”和“更少掏空效应”,具体而言,纵向兼任高管通过降低管理者代理成本发挥了“监督效应”,通过减少企业关联交易的利益流出发挥了“更少掏空效应”。文章拓展了纵向兼任高管的公司治理效应研究,是对其经济后果的有益补充。
英文摘要:
      This paper studies the impact of vertical interlocks of executives on the investment efficiency in China’s listed companies. The results show that: vertical interlocks of executives can significantly improve the enterprises’ investment efficiency. When subdividing different types of concurrent duty category, compared to the vertical interlocks of the executive, the vertical interlocks of the chairman has a stronger influence on the investment efficiency. When further researching action its mechanism, we found that vertical interlocks of executives exert the “supervision effect” and “less tunneling effect” at the same time. Specifically, vertical interlocks of executives play a “supervisory effect” by reducing managerial agency costs, and play a “less tunneling effect” by reducing the outflow of benefits of affiliated transactions. This paper expands the corporate governance effect of vertical interlocks of executives, which is a beneficial supplement to economic consequences of vertical interlocks of the executive.
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