新时代中国特色社会主义审计功能的经济学解析——基于中国式分权的视角

DOI：

中文关键词: 国家审计, 效用约束, 国家治理, 中国式分权

英文关键词:national audit, utility constraints, national governance, Chinese-style decentralization

基金项目:江苏省社会科学基金一般项目（17EYB016）的阶段性成果；南京审计大学政府审计研究基金的资助。

作者	单位
庄尚文李陈华	南京审计大学经济学院

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中文摘要:

当前，新时代中国特色社会主义国家审计在国家治理体系中的地位日益凸显。从中国式分权的视角对其功能进行规范性地经济学解析，可以为“改革审计管理体制”提供一定的理论指导。在中国式分权背景下，为了防范地方政府运用相机治理权时偏离中央政府的效用目标，中央需要对地方治理权施加合理的约束。本文构造了一个理论模型，通过比较不同的信息条件与治理权配置结构下的公共物品最优供给水平，阐释了国家审计对地方治理权的约束机制，进而提出推进审计管理体制改革的建议：(1)加强审计组织和技术的现代化建设，降低国家审计活动的信息与劳动成本；(2)细化审计方案、强化审计问责，形成地方治理权的自实施与可置信的约束机制；(3)增强审计的独立性与公共性，保障地方治理权的运用符合公共利益的目标；(4)完善政府绩效审计与官员晋升激励的耦合机制，引导地方政府有序竞争。

英文摘要:

At present, the socialism national audit with Chinese characteristics in the new era has become increasingly prominent in the national governance system. From the perspective of Chinese-style decentralization, the normative economics analysis of its functions can provide some theoretical guidance for the "reform audit management system." In the context of Chinese-style decentralization, in order to prevent local governments from deviating from the central government’s utility objectives when using the discretional right of governance, the central government needs to impose reasonable constraints on local governance rights. This paper builds a theoretical model, and compares the optimal supply of public goods under different information conditions and governance rights allocation structure, explains the national audit's restraint mechanism for local governance rights, and then puts forward proposals for advancing audit management system reforms: (i) Strengthen the modernization of auditing operation and technology, reduce the information and labor costs of national auditing activities; (ii) Refine the audit plan, strengthen audit accountability, and form a self-enforcing and credible constraint mechanism for the use of local governance rights; (iii) Enhance the independence and publicity of the audit to ensure that the use of local governance rights is in line with the objectives of the public interest; (iv) Perfect the coupling mechanism between government performance auditing and promotion of officials, and then guide local government orderly competition.

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