审计质量能否抑制控股股东的过度融资行为?
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  控股股东;过度融资;审计质量;公司治理
英文关键词:controlling shareholders; over financing; audit quality; corporate governance
基金项目:
作者单位
刘孟晖 李志雪 李晓庆 郑州大学商学院 
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中文摘要:
      审计的外部治理作用是公司治理的重要问题。现有文献着重探讨审计能否抑制大股东的利益侵占行为,但较少关注审计对企业融资行为的影响。以我国A股非金融类上市公司为样本,本文研究了控股股东的过度融资行为,以及审计对控股股东过度融资行为的抑制作用。研究发现,控股股东与企业的过度融资率存在显著正向关系;当控股股东持股比例较高时,随着控股股东持股比例的增加,企业的过度融资率也在增加,控股股东表现出较强的利益侵占效应;当控股股东持股比例较低时,企业不会进行过度融资,此时控股股东表现出一种利益协同效应。同时,高质量的审计能够抑制控股股东的过度融资行为。
英文摘要:
      The external governance of the audit is an important issue in the research of corporate governance. It has been discussed that the auditor can restrain the interest occupation behavior of the large shareholders, and the research on the influence of the audit on the over financing behavior of the enterprise is limited. Taking the non financial listed company of China as a sample, the over financing behavior of the controlling shareholders is studied, and the effect of the audit on the over financing of the controlling shareholders is studied. The research has found that the controlling shareholder has a significant positive relationship with the over financing rate of the enterprise; when the holding proportion of the controlling shareholder is higher, the over financing rate of the enterprise increases with the increase of the holding proportion of the controlling shareholder, and the controlling shareholder shows a strong entrenchment effect. When the holding ratio of controlling shareholders is low, the controlling shareholders will not over finance, which shows a kind of benefit synergy effect. At the same time, the high quality audit can restrain the controlling shareholder’s excessive financing behavior.
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