共同机构所有权与企业短贷长投:协同治理抑或合谋舞弊
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北京市社会科学基金项目(23LLGLC125)


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    摘要:

    基于2008—2022年A股上市公司数据,实证检验共同机构所有权与企业短贷长投之间的作用关系。研究结果显示,共同机构所有权能够显著抑制企业短贷长投,且主要通过发挥信息协同效应和监督治理效应实现。在非国有企业、分析师关注度和市场竞争程度较低的样本中,共同机构所有权的抑制作用更为明显。进一步研究发现,经济政策不确定性会弱化共同机构所有权的治理效果;最终共同机构所有权通过抑制短贷长投降低了企业的财务风险和审计费用。研究结论为推动共同机构所有权发展,治理企业短贷长投和完善相关监管措施提供了参考。

    Abstract:

    This study empirically examines the relationship between common institutional ownership and company’s short-term loans for long-term investments based on data from A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2022. The results indicate that common institutional ownership significantly mitigates company’s short-term loans for long-term investments, primarily through information coordination and supervisory governance effects. This inhibitory effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower analyst coverage, and in less competitive markets. Furthermore, economic policy uncertainty is found to weaken the governance effect of common institutional ownership. Ultimately, common institutional ownership reduces firms’ financial risks and audit fees by inhibiting short-term loans for long-term investments. The findings provide insights for promoting the development of common institutional ownership, managing company’s short-term loans for long-term investments, and improving relevant regulatory measures.

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吴非,牛梦月.共同机构所有权与企业短贷长投:协同治理抑或合谋舞弊[J].南京审计大学学报test,2025,22(3):71-82

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  • 在线发布日期: 2025-06-03
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