Abstract:The transfer of a portion of state-owned capital to replenish social security funds is an important policy measure for enhancing the sustainability of the basic pension insurance system and ensuring that the benefits of state-owned enterprise development are shared by all citizens. This study treats the implementation of the policy of transferring state-owned capital to replenish the social security fund as a quasi-natural experiment and uses a sample of non-financial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets over the period 2010 to 2023 to empirically examine its impact on audit pricing. The results based on the staggered difference-in-differences model show that the policy of transferring state-owned capital to social security funds significantly reduces audit pricing, primarily by mitigating auditors’ perceived risk and lowering audit costs. Heterogeneity analyses further indicate that this effect is more pronounced in SOEs with stronger internal governance, more stringent external monitoring, and those operating in regions with a higher level of legal development. With respect to post-transfer ownership arrangements, both the social security fund and the finance department, as state-owned equity holding entities, exert significant downward pressure on audit pricing, whereas the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) has no significant effect. In addition, while reducing audit pricing, the state-owned capital transfer policy also improves the audit quality of SOEs. This study provides new evidence on the economic consequences of the policy of transferring state-owned capital to social security funds and offers important policy implications for optimizing the implementation of this reform and promoting the high-quality development of SOEs.