国有企业集团高管薪酬倒挂对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究
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国家自然科学基金面上项目(72372144)


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    摘要:

    薪酬制度改革是深化国企改革、兼顾激励效率与分配公平,助推国有企业高质量发展的重要抓手。以2015—2023年国有企业集团及其控股上市公司为研究样本,手工收集并匹配集团与下属上市公司高管薪酬数据,考察国有企业集团高管薪酬倒挂对上市公司盈余管理的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,国有企业集团高管薪酬倒挂加剧了上市公司盈余管理行为。机制检验发现,薪酬倒挂会削弱集团层面对上市公司的行政管控动机,强化上市公司层面高管薪酬辩护动机,进而加剧盈余管理。进一步分析发现,当集团金字塔层级较长、两权分离度较大、上市公司面临更大的相对业绩压力以及高管相对薪酬水平更高时,薪酬倒挂加剧上市公司盈余管理的效应更为显著。研究结论不仅为理解中国特色国有企业集团治理机制提供了微观层面的经验支撑,而且能够为国有资产监管部门完善薪酬制度改革、促进薪酬契约有效性、推动国有企业高质量发展提供参考。

    Abstract:

    Executive compensation reform represents a pivotal mechanism for deepening state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform, balancing incentive efficiency with distributive fairness, and fostering high-quality SOE development. Drawing on a hand-collected dataset of executive compensation matched between SOE group headquarters and their listed subsidiaries from 2015 to 2023, this study empirically examines the effect of executive compensation inversion on the earnings management of listed subsidiaries and its underlying mechanisms. We document that executive compensation inversion significantly exacerbates earnings management in listed subsidiaries. Mechanism analyses reveal that compensation inversion attenuates group headquarters’ administrative control over subsidiaries while amplifying subsidiary executives’ compensation justification motives, thereby intensifying earnings management. Cross-sectional analyses further show that the exacerbating effect of compensation inversion on earnings management is more pronounced when the group has more pyramid layers, the separation between ownership and control rights is greater, the listed company faces higher relative performance pressure, and executives’ relative compensation levels are higher. Our findings provide micro-level empirical evidence on the governance mechanisms of Chinese SOE groups and offer policy implications for state asset regulators to refine compensation reforms, enhance the efficacy of compensation contracts, and advance high-quality SOE development.

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纳超洪,戴秀秀,樊 骁.国有企业集团高管薪酬倒挂对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究[J].南京审计大学学报,2026,23(6):57-67

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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-11-17
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