Abstract:Executive compensation reform represents a pivotal mechanism for deepening state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform, balancing incentive efficiency with distributive fairness, and fostering high-quality SOE development. Drawing on a hand-collected dataset of executive compensation matched between SOE group headquarters and their listed subsidiaries from 2015 to 2023, this study empirically examines the effect of executive compensation inversion on the earnings management of listed subsidiaries and its underlying mechanisms. We document that executive compensation inversion significantly exacerbates earnings management in listed subsidiaries. Mechanism analyses reveal that compensation inversion attenuates group headquarters’ administrative control over subsidiaries while amplifying subsidiary executives’ compensation justification motives, thereby intensifying earnings management. Cross-sectional analyses further show that the exacerbating effect of compensation inversion on earnings management is more pronounced when the group has more pyramid layers, the separation between ownership and control rights is greater, the listed company faces higher relative performance pressure, and executives’ relative compensation levels are higher. Our findings provide micro-level empirical evidence on the governance mechanisms of Chinese SOE groups and offer policy implications for state asset regulators to refine compensation reforms, enhance the efficacy of compensation contracts, and advance high-quality SOE development.