Abstract:Using Chinese -share non-financial listed companies from 2003 to 2022 as the research sample, and taking the randomized accounting information quality inspections conducted by the Ministry of Finance as an exogenous policy shock, this study employs a staggered difference-in-differences method to empirically examine the optimizing effect of government accounting and financial supervision on executive compensation contracts. The findings reveal that government accounting and financial supervision, by improving corporate governance standards, enhancing the governance effectiveness of compensation committees, and reinforcing the role of media supervision, can effectively curb excess executive perquisite consumption, raise the level of explicit executive compensation, and strengthen pay-performance sensitivity, thereby promoting the optimization of executive compensation contracts from implicit compensation toward explicit performance orientation. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this optimizing effect is more pronounced in regions with higher degrees of marketization, and that the governance effects on excess executive perquisite consumption and pay-performance sensitivity are significantly stronger for state-owned enterprises than for non-state-owned enterprises. However, constrained by compensation regulation policies, the improvement in explicit compensation for state-owned enterprises is relatively limited. Extended tests find that government accounting and financial supervision can also promote an increase in equity incentive intensity, optimize the structure of long-term and short-term explicit compensation incentives, and achieve overall optimization of compensation contracts. These conclusions extend the research framework on government regulation and corporate governance, and provide important policy implications for deepening the reform of the accounting oversight system and improving corporate compensation governance mechanisms.