政府财会监督与高管薪酬契约优化——基于会计信息质量随机检查的准自然实验
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国家社会科学基金一般项目(25BJL019)


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    摘要:

    选取2003—2022年中国A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,以财政部开展的会计信息质量随机检查为外生政策冲击,实证检验了政府财会监督对高管薪酬契约的优化效应。研究发现,政府财会监督通过改善公司治理水平、提升薪酬委员会治理效能并强化媒体监督作用,能够有效抑制高管超额在职消费,提升高管显性薪酬水平并增强薪酬业绩敏感性,推动高管薪酬契约由隐性补偿向显性绩效导向优化。异质性分析表明,该优化效应在市场化程度较高的地区更为显著,且对国有企业高管超额在职消费和薪酬业绩敏感性的优化效果显著强于非国有企业。但受制于薪酬管制政策的约束,国有企业显性薪酬的提升效果相对受限。拓展性检验发现,政府财会监督还能促进股权激励强度提升,优化长短期显性薪酬激励结构,实现薪酬契约的整体优化。上述结论拓展了政府监管与公司治理的研究框架,为深化财会监督制度改革和完善企业薪酬治理机制提供了政策启示。

    Abstract:

    Using Chinese -share non-financial listed companies from 2003 to 2022 as the research sample, and taking the randomized accounting information quality inspections conducted by the Ministry of Finance as an exogenous policy shock, this study employs a staggered difference-in-differences method to empirically examine the optimizing effect of government accounting and financial supervision on executive compensation contracts. The findings reveal that government accounting and financial supervision, by improving corporate governance standards, enhancing the governance effectiveness of compensation committees, and reinforcing the role of media supervision, can effectively curb excess executive perquisite consumption, raise the level of explicit executive compensation, and strengthen pay-performance sensitivity, thereby promoting the optimization of executive compensation contracts from implicit compensation toward explicit performance orientation. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this optimizing effect is more pronounced in regions with higher degrees of marketization, and that the governance effects on excess executive perquisite consumption and pay-performance sensitivity are significantly stronger for state-owned enterprises than for non-state-owned enterprises. However, constrained by compensation regulation policies, the improvement in explicit compensation for state-owned enterprises is relatively limited. Extended tests find that government accounting and financial supervision can also promote an increase in equity incentive intensity, optimize the structure of long-term and short-term explicit compensation incentives, and achieve overall optimization of compensation contracts. These conclusions extend the research framework on government regulation and corporate governance, and provide important policy implications for deepening the reform of the accounting oversight system and improving corporate compensation governance mechanisms.

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刘怀德,周 欣.政府财会监督与高管薪酬契约优化——基于会计信息质量随机检查的准自然实验[J].南京审计大学学报,2026,23(6):68-78

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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-11-17
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