刘骅,朱逢雪.乡村振兴专项债券发行中政府决策行为分析[J].南京审计学院学报,2021,(5):
乡村振兴专项债券发行中政府决策行为分析
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  乡村振兴  专项债券  演化博弈  系统仿真  政府决策行为  政府补贴
英文关键词:rural revitalization  special debt  evolutionary game  system simulation  government decision-making behaviour  government subsidies
基金项目:国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BGL062);南京审计大学首批政府审计研究课题(GASA161016);江苏省研究生实践创新项目(SJCX21_0807)
作者单位
刘骅,朱逢雪 南京审计大学 金融学院江苏 南京 211815 
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中文摘要:
      乡村振兴专项债券能够拓宽乡村振兴战略的融资渠道,有效破解资金制约瓶颈。依据政府专项债券发行的现实需求与政策背景,运用基于有限理性假设的演化博弈理论,构建政府乡村振兴专项债券发行的演化博弈模型,对中央政府与地方政府策略选择的演化稳定性进行分析。在此基础上采用模拟仿真方法,引入专项债券规模系数与收益系数,模拟仿真博弈主体的行为演化过程。系统仿真结果表明,专项债券债务规模膨胀与债券收益提升将分别对债券有序发行起到抑制与促进作用。最后,结合“偿还安全、专款专用”的监管要求以及“兴产业、拓渠道”的发展理念,提出乡村振兴专项债券可持续发展的政策组合。
英文摘要:
      The special bonds for rural revitalization can broaden the financing channels of the rural revitalization strategy and effectively break the bottleneck of capital constraints. According to the actual needs and policy background of government special bond issuance, using the evolutionary game theory based on the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs the evolutionary game model of the issuance of Government Rural Revitalization special bonds, and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategic choice of the central government and local government. On this basis, the simulation method is adopted to introduce the scale coefficient and return coefficient of the special bond to simulate the behavior evolution process of the game players.The system simulation results show that the expansion of the scale of special bond debt and the increase in bond yield will inhibit and promote the orderly issuance of bonds respectively. Finally, combining the regulatory requirements of “safe repayment and special funds for special use” and the development concept of “prospering industry and expanding channels”, this paper puts forward the policy combination of sustainable development of special bonds for Rural Revitalization.
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