Abstract:On the basis of analyzing the cost and benefit of family controlling shareholder’s decision on tax avoidance and especially focusing on non-tax cost brought by agency problem, this paper makes a research on factors affecting family listed companies’tax avoidance behavior from two dimensions of corporate governance, namely: ownership structure and board structure. The study finds that: the separation degree of control rights and cash flow rights is positively related to the degree of tax avoidance, which states the higher separation degree of the two rights, the more serious the tax avoidance. Long-term mechanism ownership has significantly negative relation with tax avoidance, which indicates a stable institutional investors can supervise the controlling shareholders effectively and the degree of tax avoidance is thus lower. The combination of chairman of the board and CEO has a significantly positive relation with tax avoidance, which indicates that the combination of two duties is not in favor of rights restriction and tax avoidance is even serious. The equity dispersion degree, board size and the proportion of independent directors are not significant in statistics.