政府干预、管理层自利与国企过度投资
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国家自然科学基金资助项目(71402120)


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    摘要:

    利用我国上市企业2009—2014年数据,从企业外部和内部探寻引起国企过度投资的原因,并探讨最终控制人对国企过度投资的影响,结果表明:现阶段国有企业依然存在过度投资的现象;政府干预是导致国企过度投资的外部因素,管理层自利是引起国企过度投资的内部因素,二者与国企过度投资均呈显著正相关关系;与政府机构控制的国有企业相比,国有公司控制的国有企业过度投资更为严重。

    Abstract:

    Using the sample data of listed companies from 2009 to 2014, this paper not only studies the reason of over-investment in state-owned enterprises from internal and external aspects, but also studies how ultimate controller influences the over-investment of state-owned enterprises. The results indicate that in the state-owned enterprises, over-investment still exists. Government intervention is the external factor which may lead to the over-investment of state owned enterprises and managerial entrenchment is the internal factor. Both of the two factors show a significantly positive correlation with over-investment. And the enterprises subject to the state-owned enterprises are inclined to over-investment, compared to the enterprises subject to government institution.

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佟爱琴,李雨佳,杨柳.政府干预、管理层自利与国企过度投资[J].南京审计大学学报,2016,(1):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2016-01-04
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