高管审计师背景、会计信息质量与审计收费——基于A股制造业公司的经验数据
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浙江工商大学科研创新基金(ZJ13140100024)


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    摘要:

    以2011—2013年A股制造业公司为样本研究高管的审计师背景对公司的会计信息质量和审计收费的影响,在研究审计收费时按照工作内容和职责两个维度将高管进一步细分,分析不同类型的高管事务所关联与审计收费的关系,结果显示:具有审计师背景的高管的所在公司为了实现自身利益最大化会进行盈余管理,导致会计信息质量降低。事务所为了弥补较高的审计风险会增加审计收费,但是有事务所关联的财务岗位高管凭借人际关系和“校友效应”能够降低审计收费,非财务岗位高管由于职责和利益所限不能降低审计收费。

    Abstract:

    Taking A-share manufacturing companies from 2011 to 2013 as samples, this paper makes a study on the influence of the background of senior auditors on the quality of accounting information and audit fees, the relationship between different types of associations of executive firms and audit fees on the basis of the subdivision of the executives in the two dimensions, which are the contents of the audit fees and the responsibilities of the job. The results show that: in order to achieve their own interests, the company with the background of senior auditors will choose to carry out earnings management, which will reduce the quality of accounting information. Accounting firms will increase audit fees in order to make up for higher audit risk. The financial position in the association of firms can reduce the audit fees with the interpersonal relationship and the “alumni effect”, but non-financial position of the executives cannot reduce the cost of audit due to responsibilities and interests.

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刘玉龙,蒋文超,周丽颖.高管审计师背景、会计信息质量与审计收费——基于A股制造业公司的经验数据[J].南京审计大学学报,2016,13(3):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2016-05-28
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