信任环境、政企关联与企业捐赠 ——基于企业所有权的视角
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    摘要:

    基于委托代理理论,从企业所有权视角对信任环境与企业捐赠之间的关系进行实证研究,并且进一步分析政治关联对两者之间关系的影响,结果显示:从整体来看,信任环境与企业捐赠显著负相关,即制度环境的改善抑制了高管的机会主义行为,捐赠的代理问题得到缓解,但在根据控股股东性质对样本进行分组检验后发现,上述现象仅在国有控股企业中存在。政企关联削弱了信任环境对企业捐赠的影响,加剧了捐赠的代理问题,但这种现象主要体现在非国有控股企业中。非国有控股企业之所以甘愿承担政企关联所带来的更严重的捐赠代理成本,原因在于其主要想通过政企关联来发挥捐赠的政企纽带效应,以达到获取政府补贴的目的,而这种现象在国有控股企业中并不存在。

    Abstract:

    Based on principal-agent theory, this paper empirically studies the relationship between trust environment and enterprise donation from the perspective of enterprise ownership, and analyzes the changes of relationship in enterprises of different political connection. The study shows that, trust environment and enterprise donation as a whole are significantly negative correlated. Namely, the improvement of institution has restrained the executive opportunism behavior and the agency problem of donation has been alleviated.But after distinguishing the nature of big shareholder, the above phenomenon only occurs in state-owned holding enterprise. After the introduction of the adjustment variable-political connection, political connection has weakened the influence of the trust on the donation, and intensified the agency problem, but this phenomenon is mainly reflected in the non-state holding enterprises. The further study also shows the reason why the non-state holding enterprise is willing to bear more serious agency problem of donation, the intention is to achieve the purpose of obtaining government subsidies by political connection, and the phenomenon does not occur in the state-owned holding enterprises under the same conditions.

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黄送钦.信任环境、政企关联与企业捐赠 ——基于企业所有权的视角[J].南京审计大学学报,2016,(4):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2016-07-14
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