管理层权力、盈余管理与薪酬差距激励效应
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国家社会科学基金项目(17BGL078)


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    摘要:

    以我国沪深A股上市公司2008—2016年的数据为样本,研究管理层权力作用下高管盈余管理行为对薪酬差距激励效应的影响。研究表明,盈余操纵导致的薪酬差距,即“操纵性薪酬差距”,具有负面激励效应,会导致企业未来业绩的减损;而与公司真实利润相关的薪酬差距,即“非操纵性薪酬差距”,具有正面激励效应,会促进企业未来业绩的提升,但这种正面激励效应呈现边际递减趋势。进一步的研究表明,薪酬差距的激励效应在不同行业存在差异。当上市公司属于竞争性行业或景气度较高的行业时,非操纵性薪酬差距的正面激励效应更加显著,而操纵性薪酬差距的负面激励效应不会因行业而发生明显改变。

    Abstract:

    Taking the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2016 as samples,this paper studies the effect of executive earnings management behavior on the incentive effect of pay gap under the influence of managerial power. It shows that “manipulative pay gap”, i.e. the pay gap caused by earnings manipulation,has a negative incentive effect and harms the future performance of the company. Meanwhile,“non-manipulative pay gap”, i.e. the pay gap connected with the real profits of the company, plays a positive role in promoting the company’s future performance,but this positive incentive effect shows a marginal decline. Further research shows that incentive effect of pay gap varies from industry to industry. For companies in a competitive industry or in a booming industry,the positive incentive effect of non-manipulative pay gap is stronger, while the negative incentive effect of manipulative pay gap remains at a similar level regardless of different industries.

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佟爱琴,夏宇轩,郝雨桐.管理层权力、盈余管理与薪酬差距激励效应[J].南京审计大学学报,2019,(3):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-05-29
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