Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016 as research samples， this paper empirically analyzes the influence of executive power， executive ability and property right on the intensity of equity incentive in different control environments， such as in the course of authorization and in the course of exercise. It is found that: (1) In the course of authorization， the intensity of equity incentive increases as executive’s power grows. Executive’s power exerts a greater positive influence on the intensity than their ability. The same association is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises. (2) In the course of exercise， the stronger the executive's ability is， the more likely it is to achieve the performance goal set by the exercise， and the stronger the equity incentive to unlocking the exercise. Executive ability exerts a greater positive influence on the the equity incentive to unlocking the exercise than their power. The annual salary of executives can have a certain crowding-out effect on the intensity of equity incentive. In SOEs， a greater positive association is found between executive power and equity incentive intensity than in non-SOEs under the vested performance targets.