As an important means of regulatory transformation of CSRC， non-punitive regulation receives widespread attention from policy makers and scholars. Among them， the supervision mode with inquiry letter mechanism as the carrier makes the annual report of listed companies “remove makeup”， and the company’s existing problems are exposed to the public， which makes investors applaud. Under the risk-oriented auditing mode， it is a question worthy of discussion whether the auditor regards the inquiry letter as a risk early-warning signal and changes the audit pricing decision. Based on this， this paper， using the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2018， empirically tests the impact of the annual report inquiry letter issued by the exchange on audit pricing. The empirical results show that there is a positive correlation between the annual report inquiry letter and audit pricing. On this basis， with the help of audit delay， a measure of audit cost， it is further revealed that the improvement of audit pricing is the result of the auditor’s demand for compensation for risk premium， and the auditor has not increased more audit input to the listed companies receiving the inquiry letter. This kind of correlation is more obvious in the non-state-owned companies， the companies with lower level of internal governance and the companies in the areas with poorer marketization.