频繁并购重组与异常审计收费
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国家社会科学基金项目(15XJY019);云南省教育厅科学研究基金项目(2020Y0045;2019JS004);云南大学基金项目(2018z018;YDY17004)


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    摘要:

    以2012—2017年A股上市公司为样本,采用异常审计费用衡量审计师对上市公司频繁并购重组的风险溢价,探究企业频繁并购重组与审计师风险溢价收费的关系,研究发现企业频繁并购重组会导致审计师风险溢价提高。从商誉和盈余管理角度探究其路径机制发现,商誉和真实盈余管理是频繁并购重组导致更高审计师风险溢价两个重要中介变量,而应计盈余管理并没有发挥中介作用,即频繁并购重组企业操纵利润的手段倾向于采用真实盈余管理,而非应计盈余管理。

    Abstract:

    Taking the A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as a sample, this paper uses the abnormal audit fees to measure the risk premium of auditors on the frequent mergers and acquisitions of listed companies, and explores the relationship between frequent mergers and acquisitions and auditors' risk premiums. It is found that frequent mergers and acquisitions of enterprises will lead to an increase in the auditor's risk premium. From the perspective of goodwill and earnings management, it is found that goodwill and real earnings management are two important mediators of higher auditor risk premium caused by frequent mergers and acquisitions. However, accrued earnings management does not play an intermediary role, that is, enterprises with frequent mergers and acquisitions tend to manipulate profits by means of real earnings management instead of accrued earnings management.

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陈 欣a,,宋玉禄a,李振东b.频繁并购重组与异常审计收费[J].南京审计大学学报,2020,(3):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2020-07-15
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