Taking all A share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2010 to 2017 as a research sample, this paper analyzes the audit characteristics of zombie companies and explores the moderating effect of internal control on the relationship between them. The study finds that compared with non zombie companies, zombie companies tend to pay lower audit fees, and are more likely to receive non standard opinions, to choose non high quality auditors for audit. Besides, their internal control environment is more likely to be weaker. Further research finds that higher internal control quality makes zombie enterprises more likely to receive standard and unreserved audit opinions, but non zombie companies with better internal control quality tend to pay higher audit fees and to choose high qualified auditors. Further research based on the nature of property rights finds that: (1) state owned zombies tend to pay lower audit fees, in which the central state owned enterprises’ audit fee is likely to be even lower; (2) private zombies are more likely to receive “non standard” audit opinions; (3) private zombies and local state owned zombies are more likely to choose unqualified auditors, and local state owned zombies are more inclined to do that. The study about the audit characteristics of zombies from the perspective of corporate governance provides empirical evidence for identifying zombies.