审计师会收取并购商誉风险溢价吗?——基于代理成本和经营风险视角
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国家自然科学基金项目(71172224)


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    摘要:

    并购是企业提高竞争力的重要手段,但近期并购商誉中对未来预期的风险暴露引起资本市场震动。以2008—2018年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证分析并购商誉对审计费用的影响。研究结果表明:并购商誉与审计费用正相关,即审计师能够成功识别商誉风险并在审计费用上加以反应,体现出审计制度的有效性。通过作用机制检验发现,代理成本和经营风险在并购商誉对审计费用的影响中发挥了部分中介作用。进一步考虑外部监督的调节效应,发现机构投资者能调节代理成本和经营风险的中介效应。

    Abstract:

    Mergers and acquisitions are an important means for companies to improve their competitiveness. However, the expected risk exposure of future goodwill in recent mergers and acquisitions has caused shocks in the capital market. Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as a research sample, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of M&A goodwill on audit fees. The research results show that M&A goodwill is positively correlated with audit fees, that is, auditors can successfully identify goodwill risks and react to audit fees, which reflects the effectiveness of the audit system. Through the inspection of the mechanism of action, it is found that agency costs and operating risks play a part of the intermediary role in the influence of M&A goodwill on audit fees. Further considering the moderating effect of external supervision, this paper finds that institutional investors can adjust the mediating effect of agency costs and operating risks.

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张阳a,徐子慧a,王晓丹b.审计师会收取并购商誉风险溢价吗?——基于代理成本和经营风险视角[J].南京审计大学学报,2021,(2):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-03-24
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