Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2017 as samples, and using extended cost stickiness model, this article explores the influence of local governments and institutional shareholders on cost stickiness of enterprises after the “Eight Regulations”, as well as the regulatory role of institutional shareholders. The study found that government subsidies would enhance cost stickiness, institutional shareholders can inhibit cost stickiness, and institutional shareholders play a negative role in regulating the relationship between government subsidies and cost stickiness. Further research found that the impact of government subsidies on cost stickiness has nothing to do with the nature of corporate property rights; The influence of institutional shareholders on cost stickiness and the regulatory role of institutional shareholders only exist in non-state-owned enterprises. Different regions have different relationships concerning government subsidies, institutional shareholders, and cost stickiness. The impact of government subsidies on cost stickiness only exists in the years when local officials have not changed.