Taking the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as samples, this paper analyzes whether the quality of accounting information of listed companies will be affected by the board faultlines and the regulating effect of internal control on the relationship between them. The results show that the existence of board faultlines weakens the willingness and ability of supervision of board members, thus reducing the quality of accounting information disclosed by listed companies. Meanwhile, effective internal control can significantly restrain the negative influence of the board faultlines on accounting information quality by inhibiting management opportunistic behavior. Further analysis shows that the informal board hierarchy and shareholding ratio can also weaken the impact of board faultlines on the quality of accounting information.In addition, in state-owned enterprises or areas with low degree of marketization, the negative impact of the board faultlines on the quality of corporate accounting information is enhanced.This research deepens and enriches the study on the economic consequences of the board faultlines, and also provides a theoretical basis for listed companies to improve internal control, strengthen the supervision of management, thus improving the quality of accounting information.