独立监事能减少企业违规行为吗?——基于“四大”审计的中介效应分析
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国家社会科学基金项目(16BGL068);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(16YJC630155)


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    摘要:

    监事会的职责之一是监督公司和高管的行为,因此需要保持相对独立,然而我国监事会一直存在独立性较弱的问题。以A股上市公司2009—2019年的数据为研究样本,检验以不领薪为特征的独立监事对公司违规行为的影响,并研究企业聘请“四大”会计师事务所审计的影响机制。实证结果表明:独立监事能有效减少企业违规行为并促进企业获取更高质量的审计。根据影响机制研究可知,聘请“四大”会计师事务所审计在独立监事与企业违规之间的关系中起中介作用。进一步研究的结果表明,当内部控制薄弱、监事会较为活跃时,独立监事监督效果会更好。

    Abstract:

    One of the duties of the board of supervisors is to supervise the behaviors of the company and its senior executives,so it needs to maintain relative independence. However, the problem of weak independence of the board of supervisors has always existed in China. Taking the data of A share listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as research samples, this paper examines the influence of independent supervisors characterized by non paying on corporate violations and conducts the research on the impact mechanism of companies hiring one of the “Big Four” accounting firms for auditing. The empirical results show that independent supervisors can effectively reduce corporate violations and promote enterprises to higher quality audits. According to the research on the impact mechanism, it can be seen that hiring one of the “Big Four” accounting firms to audit plays an intermediate role in the relationship between independent supervisors and corporate violations. Further results show that when the internal control of a company is weak or the board of supervisors is more active, the supervision effect of independent supervisors will be better.

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易颜新,王 榕,叶继英.独立监事能减少企业违规行为吗?——基于“四大”审计的中介效应分析[J].南京审计大学学报,2022,(2):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2022-04-01
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