公司违规与审计收费:违规公告异质性和作用机制
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重庆市技术预见与制度创新研究项目(cstc2021jsyj zzysbA0019)


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    摘要:

    以审计定价模型为切入视角,探讨了违规公告内容与审计收费的关系,并进一步剖析违规诱增审计收费的作用机制。研究发现:违规公告异质性内容会对审计收费产生差异化影响,违规类型严重性和多样性、处罚措施严厉性均会显著诱增审计收费,而处罚措施多样性不会显著提高审计收费。进一步地,公司违规通过“审计成本”和“风险溢价”两条平行中介路径来诱增审计收费,且“审计成本”这条路径会受到事务所规模、任期长短、是否更换等变量的显著调节。研究说明违规公告文本内容能协助审计师评估风险,也表明不同情境下违规对审计收费的作用机理存在差异性。

    Abstract:

    From the perspective of audit pricing model, this paper discusses the relationship between the content of violation announcement and audit fee, and further analyzes the mechanism of audit fee induced by violation. The study finds that the heterogeneous content of violation announcement will have a differentiated impact on audit fees. The severity and diversity of violationand the severity of punishment measures will significantly increase audit fees, while the diversity of punishment measures will not. Further, the corporate violation increases audit fees through two parallel intermediary paths of “audit cost” and “risk premium”, and the path of “audit cost” will be significantly adjusted by such variables as the size of the firm, the length of the term, whether to change the firm or not. The research shows that the text content of violation announcement can help auditors evaluate risks, and that there are differences in the mechanism of violation on audit fees in different situations.

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韩炜,刘道钦,郑国洪.公司违规与审计收费:违规公告异质性和作用机制[J].南京审计大学学报,2022,(3):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2022-05-31
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