Under the background of the regionalization of the “Belt and Road” with the Central bank's digital RMB, a pound-for pair evolutionary game model is constructed between China and countries along the “Belt and Road” and between China and major international currency issuing countries along the “Belt and Road”, and the game process and equilibrium results of stakeholders of the Central bank's digital RMB in the regionalization process of the “Belt and Road” are studied. And through the scenario simulation experiment to find the final evolutionary equilibrium point of the game. The results show that, although in the short term, the central bank's digital RMB will be resisted by the countries along the “Belt and Road” and the major international currency issuing countries along the “Belt and Road” in the regionalization process; But in the long term, the central bank figures in RMB in all the way “regionalization” area tend to adopt the “launching” strategy in the game, and “neighbourhood” all the way along the countries tend to adopt the strategy of “acceptance”, along the main international currencies also tend to adopt “cooperation” strategy, so as to promote the development of diversification in the future international monetary system.