Taking the “Opinions on Further Improving the Quality of Listed Companies” policy issued by the State Council in October 2020 as a research opportunity, based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021, this paper uses bidirectional fixed effect model to investigate the governance role of D&O liability insurance on accounting information quality, as well as whether governance of party organization plays alternative or complementary effect in the process of exerting this governance effect, and further analyze its transmission effect and corporate heterogeneity effects. We find that D&O liability insurance has a governance role in the quality of accounting information, and the “two-way entry” style of governance of party organization can enhance this governance effect, that is a complementary effect, while the “cross appointment” style of governance of party organization inhibits this governance effect, that is a alternative effect. We further analyzed and found that D&O liability insurance will have a governance effect on the accounting information quality by promoting corporate innovation and improving internal control quality, and this governance effect is more significant in companies with higher media attention or profitability. The above results not only expand the research on the influencing factors of accounting information quality from a new perspective, but also enrich the individual and joint governance effects of D&O liability insurance and governance of party organization, and provide useful practical insights for relevant stakeholders such as governments and enterprises to explore the positive role of D&O liability insurance and improve accounting information quality.