Following the reform of the national supervision system, scholarly discussions on the relationship between supervision and inspection have largely centered on the analytical paradigm of checks and balances, which has given rise to theoretical concerns about “supervision-centeredness”. This static perspective of power gaming, to a certain extent, obscures the core value of enhancing governance effectiveness that the supervision and inspection authorities embody as a unified anti-corruption front. From a functionalist perspective, the prosecution of duty-related crimes exhibits a dynamically progressive structure comprising three stages-investigation, review and prosecution, and trial-and the relationship between supervision and inspection correspondingly manifests phased features characterized by the division of dual-track investigation, the leading role of substantive review, and the return of trial authority to its proper position. Currently, hindered by theoretical cognitive biases and institutional supply deficits, the supervision-inspection relationship faces practical obstacles such as obstructed evidence transformation, rough pre-intervention mechanisms, and weakened checks through review. To transform institutional strengths into governance effectiveness, it is imperative to adopt functionalism as a theoretical guide: on the value level, to correct cognitive misunderstandings with governance effectiveness; on the structural level, to alleviate convergence blockages through functional coordination; and on the mechanism level, to reshape the review function through collaborative checks. By refining the mechanisms for the articulation of investigation, substantiating the mechanisms for review and checks, and standardizing the mechanisms for responding to judicial proceedings, a relationship between supervision and inspection characterized by clearly defined powers and responsibilities, coordination, and efficiency can ultimately be established.