控股股东股权质押、审计师行业专长与财务报告可比性
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    摘要:

    以2007—2017年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验控股股东股权质押是否会影响上市公司财务报告可比性。研究发现,控股股东进行了股权质押的上市公司其财务报告可比性更低,且当审计师行业专长较低时这一现象更为显著。进一步分析发现,在股权质押背景下,控股股东在短期内为规避行业监管,维持股价稳定而操纵盈余是其股权质押降低财务报告可比性的内在动机,但这仅是其在股权质押期间的权宜之策。结合两类代理问题,在第一类代理问题较少、第二类代理问题较多时,控股股东股权质押对财务报告可比性的负向作用更为显著。本文结论丰富了控股股东股权质押的经济后果以及财务报告可比性的影响因素研究,为政府及监管层制定相关政策提供了理论参考与经验证据。

    Abstract:

    Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as research object,this paper empirically tests whether the share pledge of controlling shareholders will affect the comparability of financial reports of listed companies.The study finds that the financial reports of listed companies after the share pledge of controlling shareholders are less comparable,and this negative correlation is mainly reflected in the group with lower industry expertise of auditors.Further research reveals that in the context of share pledge, controlling shareholders in the short term may manipulate earnings in order to avoid the industry supervision and maintain the stability of stock price,which is the intrinsic motivation to reduce the comparability of financial reports,but this is only a stopgap measure during the share pledge period. Combining the two types of agency problems,when the first kind of agency problem (between the shareholders and managers)is low and the second kind of agency problem(between major shareholders and minor shareholders)is high,the negative effect of the controlling shareholder’s share pledge on the comparability of financial report is more obvious.The conclusions of this paper enrich the economic consequences of the controlling shareholders’s share pledge and the influencing factors of the comparability of financial reports,and provide theoretical and empirical evidence for the government and regulatory authorities to formulate relevant policies.

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王宇峰,刘 颖.控股股东股权质押、审计师行业专长与财务报告可比性[J].南京审计大学学报,2019,(6):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-11-28
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