Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as research object,this paper empirically tests whether the share pledge of controlling shareholders will affect the comparability of financial reports of listed companies.The study finds that the financial reports of listed companies after the share pledge of controlling shareholders are less comparable,and this negative correlation is mainly reflected in the group with lower industry expertise of auditors.Further research reveals that in the context of share pledge, controlling shareholders in the short term may manipulate earnings in order to avoid the industry supervision and maintain the stability of stock price,which is the intrinsic motivation to reduce the comparability of financial reports,but this is only a stopgap measure during the share pledge period. Combining the two types of agency problems,when the first kind of agency problem (between the shareholders and managers)is low and the second kind of agency problem(between major shareholders and minor shareholders)is high,the negative effect of the controlling shareholder’s share pledge on the comparability of financial report is more obvious.The conclusions of this paper enrich the economic consequences of the controlling shareholders’s share pledge and the influencing factors of the comparability of financial reports,and provide theoretical and empirical evidence for the government and regulatory authorities to formulate relevant policies.