The investment efficiency of OFDI enterprises along the Belt and Road is related to the smooth implementation of China's initiative of the “Belt and Road” . Based on the sample of Chinese listed companies of OFDI along the Belt and Road, combined with the perspective of government intervention and the theory of senior management team, this paper empirically analyzes the mechanism of government intervention and the characteristics of senior management team on the excessive investment of enterprises. The study finds that, on the whole, state-owned holding increases the possibility of excessive investment. Political affiliation, executive compensation and years of service have a strengthening effect on excessive investment behavior of enterprises, while executive shareholding and board supervision have an inhibiting effect on excessive investment behavior of enterprises. The people's right of speech and the quality of government management in the host country harmonize the excessive investment behavior of enterprises and make the investment efficiency return to rationality. However, considering the differences in geographical location and economic environment of countries along the Belt And Road, the above research conclusions are different due to the heterogeneity of investment regions. The research results of this paper have important inspiration and reference for the Chinese government to optimize the relevant policies of the “Belt and Road” initiative and the “going out” enterprises to improve the investment efficiency.