By using statistics of China listed companies from 2009 to 2011 as a sample, this paper first chose different accounting index to represent company performance, with the goal to inspect the existence of top managers compensation stickiness, then investigated how the quality of internal control influences the stickiness of top managers compensation. Our empirical results indicated when the performance is represented by ROA, the compensation is more sensitive to performance and didnt show any stickiness. When the performance is represented by DNP, the sample in our research did show the stickiness of top managers compensation, but the degree of stickiness has been weakened by the influence of high quality internal control. This to some extent reflects most managers choose earnings management to reinforce the sensibility. By group testing, we found that the higher the quality of internal control is, the greater the sensitivity of top managers compensation to company performance DNP is, and the smaller the degree of stickiness is. These results show internal control can virtually restrain the stickiness between performance and payment, and reinforce the sensibility between them.