股权激励如何驱动企业研发支出?——基于股权激励异质性的视角
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国家社会科学基金重点项目(13AZD002);北京市一般国外访问学者项目(067145301400);北京市青年英才计划(14076)


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    摘要:

    股权激励被视为解决研发支出中代理冲突的重要工具,但现有经验证据并不稳定甚至相互矛盾。基于股权激励异质性的视角,本文引入新的股权激励特征——股权激励价值的股价及股价波动率敏感性,考察股权激励对企业研发支出的驱动机制,并利用2006-2012年我国实施股权激励的上市公司作为样本进行检验。研究发现:股权激励对企业研发支出的驱动机制包含风险规避效应与激励效应两个相反维度,最终驱动方向与强度取决于两类效应的博弈;限制性股票的风险规避效应显著强于股票期权;股票期权的激励效应显著强于限制性股票;市场竞争程度、企业产权性质与授予动机对限制性股票与股票期权的两类效应产生调节作用。

    Abstract:

    Equity incentive is treated as an essential tool to offset the conflict in the R&D expenditure decision, but the existing evidence is contradictory. Based on the perspective of incentive heterogeneity, this paper introduces two new characteristics of equity incentive which are the equity value share price sensitivity and equity value price volatility sensitivity. We firstly study the driving mechanism of equity incentive on R&D expenditure and the different mechanism among restricted stocks and options, and then do an empirical test with the data from 2006 to 2012. This paper finds equity incentive includes opposite impacts on R&D expenditure which are the risk aversion effect and the incentive effect. The ultimate driving force depends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects. Moreover, the restricted stock holds significantly stronger risk aversion effect and significantly weaker incentive effect than the option. This paper also finds that the extent of market competition, the property rights and the grant motive moderate the two effects.

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叶陈刚,刘桂春,洪峰.股权激励如何驱动企业研发支出?——基于股权激励异质性的视角[J].审计与经济研究,2015,(3):

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