By analyzing the data of the non financial A share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2013，this study examines the effect of pressure felt by management to meet or beat analysts earnings forecasts on firms M&A behavior.Further，we explore the relationship between earnings pressure and firms M&A behavior based on internal control and managerial power views.We find that firms under such earnings pressure do not tend to accept M&A，but internal control weakens the negative relationship between earnings pressure and M&A，compared with firms with lower quality of the internal control，firms with higher quality of the internal control under such earnings pressure are more likely to accept M&A.Specifically，this phenomenon will become more apparent when managerial power is dispersed inside a firm.This result indicates that during the transitional period，it has an important theoretical value and practical significance to clarify the relationship between earnings pressure and firms M&A behavior and the governance mechanism of this relationship.