Abstract:This paper studies the influence of the actual controller’s control rights structure on the design of equity incentive plan. Sample data of 959 listed companies in China which implemented the equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2015 were collected. Through observation and analysis of the results of a series of regression analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) The control right of the actual controller has a significant positive correlation with the setting of the validity period of the equity incentive; (2) In the state owned enterprise, the influence of the actual controller’s control right on the validity period of the equity incentive is more obvious, and will tend to set a longer period of equity incentive validity; (3) When the management team’s power is weak, the positive correlation between the actual controller and the validity period of the equity incentive will be enhanced. This paper puts forward two suggestions on the period of validity period setting for China’s listing companies in the equity incentive. Firstly, the actual controller should pay attention to the balance of other factors while extending the validity period of equity incentive. Secondly, it is possible to extend the validity of equity incentive in state owned enterprises by extending the exercise period.