Using data of A-share listed companies for the period of 2003-2016, this paper empirically examines the effect of managerial power on the amount of contingent liabilities and the frequency of contingency disclosed in the table. The empirical results show that managerial power decreases the contingent information identified in the financial statements, but increases the contingent information that disclosed out of the financial statements. Further studies show that environment uncertainty enhances the negative relationship between the managerial power and the contingent information identified in the financial statements, but alleviates the positive relationship between the managerial power and the contingent information disclosed out of financial statements. Managers may control the disclosure way of the contingent information to cater to self-service preferences. This paper provides a theoretical basis for government regulators which plan to regulate contingency information disclosure by solving agency issues, and it also has a reference significance for information users such as investors to dig the contingent information in and out of financial statements.