环境规制能引发“创新补偿”效应吗?——基于“波特假说”的博弈分析
DOI:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

基金项目:


Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    在“波特假说”及相关研究基础上,通过分析环境规制下企业“创新补偿”效应的生成过程,发现“创新补偿”效应主要受企业创新动机、行为和绩效三个层面因素的影响,其中既有企业内部因素,也有外部环境因素,它们相互交织,共同决定了“创新补偿”效应生成的可能性。综合企业内外因素构建的双寡头博弈模型分析结果表明,引发企业创新动机的主要因素并非环境规制,而是市场竞争与企业自身需要,但环境规制强度会影响企业R&D投入水平和创新绩效。在竞争环境中,只要具备较高的研发效率、知识吸收水平和技术成果转化率,在政府补贴政策激励下,企业通过技术创新获得的经济绩效可在一定程度上补偿环境管理成本。尤其当企业间开展合作创新时,“创新补偿”效应更为显著。

    Abstract:

    On the basis of “Potter hypothesis” and related research, the generation process of “innovative offsets” effect under environment regulation is studied. It is found that the “innovative offsets” effect is mainly influenced by such three factors as firms’ innovation motivation, behavior and performance. These internal conditions and external environmental factors combine together and determine the generation possibility of the “innovative offsets” effect. Furthermore, the duopoly game model considering the above factors shows that the firms’ innovation motivation is stimulated not by the environmental regulation, but by the market competition and their own needs. However, the firms’ R&D investment and innovation performance are related to the intensity of environmental regulation. In the competitive environment, as long as the firm has higher R&D efficiency, knowledge absorption level and conversion rate of technology innovation, the environmental cost will be offset in a certain extent by the economic performance which is achieved by the technology innovation under the government subsidies policy. Especially, when R&D cooperation is carried out among firms, the effect of “innovative offsets” is more significant.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

李卫红 ,白杨.环境规制能引发“创新补偿”效应吗?——基于“波特假说”的博弈分析[J].审计与经济研究,2018,(6):

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2018-11-22
  • 出版日期: