证券交易所非处罚性监管与审计质量——基于年报问询函信息效应和监督效应的分析
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    摘要:

    以2015—2017年A股上市公司为样本,借助中介效应的检验方法,发现交易所发放年报问询函显著降低了当年审计报告的激进性,提升了审计质量,且这种提升作用并不限于问询函中被“点名”的审计事务所;年报问询函分别通过信息效应和监督效应提升审计质量,但监督效应占主导。

    Abstract:

    Issuing inquiry letters about annual reports of the listed companies is an important means of non-penalty regulation which is conducted by the China’s Stock Exchanges. Using the 2015—2017 A-share listed companies as samples and with the method of mediation effect, we find that the inquiry letters about annual reports issued by the stock exchanges significantly reduce the radicality of the audit report and enhance audit quality. Meanwhile this enhancing effect is not affected by whether the audit office is referred to or not in the inquiry letters. We further find that the inquiry letters enhance the audit quality through information effect and supervision effect, but the supervisory effect dominates.

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陶雄华,曹松威.证券交易所非处罚性监管与审计质量——基于年报问询函信息效应和监督效应的分析[J].审计与经济研究test,2019,34(2):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-03-22
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