证券交易所非处罚性监管会影响审计师定价决策吗?——基于问询函的经验证据
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    摘要:

    交易所质询作为资本市场一种重要的非处罚性监管手段,主要聚焦上市公司的风险敏感事件,具有丰富的信息含量。而在以风险导向为基础的审计模式下,审计师在进行定价决策时是否会将交易所问询监管视作一种风险信号?以2015—2017年间的沪深A股上市公司为样本,探究了交易所问询监管对审计收费的影响。研究发现,收到交易所问询函的上市公司其审计费用显著高于未收到问询函的公司。进一步研究发现,上市公司一段时间内被频繁质询,审计师会对其收取更高的审计费用;特别是收到与会计信息相关的问询函时,审计费用增加更为显著。

    Abstract:

    As an important means of non-penalty regulation of the capital market, the Exchange's inquiry mainly focuses on the risk sensitive events of listed companies and has rich information content. Under the risk-based auditing model, does the auditor consider the exchange inquiry supervision as a risk signal when making pricing decisions? Taking the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2015 and 2017 as a sample, we first explore the impact of exchange inquiry regulation on audit fee. The study found that the listed companies receiving the exchange inquiry letter will have a significantly higher audit fee in the current year than the companies that did not receive the inquiry letter. Further research found that when a listed company is frequently questioned for a period of time, the auditor will charge a higher audit fee; in particular, when the inquiry letter related to the accounting information, the increase in the audit fee is more significant..

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米莉,黄婧,何丽娜.证券交易所非处罚性监管会影响审计师定价决策吗?——基于问询函的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2019,(4):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-07-10
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