Local debt risk is an important hidden danger of regional and systemic financial risk，therefore，properly dissolving local debt risks has become the focus of reducing the financial risks.This paper uses the multi-task principal-agent model to explore the process and mechanism of local debt management in“central-local government”，and uses the 2009-2016 provincial panel data to empirically test the hypothetical conditions proposed by the incentive contract conclusion.The results show that：（1）The“ex ante”incentives set by the central government to give local government fiscal revenue autonomy can effectively boost local governments’efforts to manage debt risks.（2）Designing“ex-ante”incentive contracts based on local government fiscal information disclosure and tax effort is effective.（3）The incentives for the effort level of local governments managing debt are“critical incentive contract”and the incentives and efforts between them have Pareto optimal equilibrium condition，and（4）The degree of“ex ante”incentives of the central government for local governments to make efforts to manage explicit and implicit debt depends on the relationship of efforts’cost between the two activities.