This paper takes the M&A restructuring events initiated by A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2008 to 2016 as a sample to study the impact of management overconfidence and the selection of independent financial advisers on the reliability of target enterprises' performance commitments, and whether independent financial advisers can restrain the negative effects of management overconfidence on the reliability of performance commitments, and finally, the differences and economic consequences of independent financial advisers with different characteristics will be explored. The results show that: (1) Listed companies with overconfident management may be overly optimistic about the high level of performance commitment and profitability of the target company shareholders. After the completion of the M&A transaction, it is easier to face the risk of unreliable performance commitment of the target enterprise; (2) On the whole, the independent financial advisers selected by listed companies in M&A restructuring transactions did not play their due role of M&A risk filtering, and hiring independent financial advisers did not effectively alleviate the unreliable performance commitment of the target enterprises; (3) Under the condition of management overconfidence in listed companies, the selection of independent financial advisers will better restrain the adverse effects of management overconfidence and improve the reliability of performance commitments of target enterprises; (4) After further distinguishing the characteristics of independent financial advisers, it is found that the selection of independent financial advisers will effectively alleviate the unreliable performance commitments of the target enterprises after the completion of M&A and reorganization transactions; (5) Compared with the low-reputation independent financial advisers, highly reputable independent financial advisers do not show a greater advantage in helping listed companies avoid the unreliability of target corporate performance commitments, that is, when selecting independent financial advisers, Reputation standards are not an absolute standard of validity.