Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as a sample， this paper studies corporate governance effects and the capital market spillover effects of compensation incentives for independent directors from the perspective of information disclosure frauds of listed companies. This paper finds that there is a U-shaped correlation between the compensation incentives of independent directors and the irregularities of information disclosure of listed companies， which indicates that too high or too low compensation incentives cannot help to restrain the illegal behavior of information disclosure. In the mechanism test， this paper finds that the non-linear changes of the performance efficiency of independent directors and the earnings quality of companies are the important reasons for the above U-shaped correlation. Further research finds that when analyst coverage and the quality of external audit is low， the above U-shaped correlation is more significant， indicating that independent directors have alternative effects on corporate supervision and governance among analysts and auditors. When the external supervision environment is poor， the incentive effect of monetary compensation on independent directors will be more prominent.