From the background of China’s economic transformation period, this paper examines the effect of government subsidies on executives perks, and the moderating effect of debt governance from the perspective of “resource change”. It is found that government subsidies had a positive impact on the executives perks. The larger scale of government subsidies, the higher level of its executives perks. However, corporate debt had an obvious restraining effect on the executives perks, and this effect was especially significant in regions with good institutional environment. Further research shows that the reason why government subsidies lead to executives perks is mainly that the government will require enterprises with receiving subsidies to assume more social responsibilities, and thus forming a relationship of “resource exchange”. Obviously, the assumption of social responsibilities will harm the performance of enterprises and weaken the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive mechanism. Therefore, enterprises often allow executives to make more perks to make up for the failure of incentive mechanism caused by the loss of monetary compensation of executives. It can be seen that perks, as an alternative incentive mechanism, may be the product of “resource exchange” between the government and enterprises, and an adaptive incentive strategy adjustment for enterprises to cope with resource-dependent environment.