国企混改、竞争战略与费用粘性
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江西省高校人文社会科学研究一般项目(JJ19114)


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    摘要:

    基于2008—2017年中国A股国有上市公司的研究样本,考察了国企混改、竞争战略与费用粘性之间的关系。研究发现,选择不同战略形式的国有企业会表现出截然不同的成本行为,相对成本领先战略而言,采用差异化战略的国有企业费用粘性更强;同时还发现,国有企业混合所有制改革能有效抑制费用粘性,且其抑制作用在差异化战略企业中更加明显。中介机制分析表明,相对成本领先战略而言,选择差异化战略的国有企业通过加剧经理人代理问题而增强费用粘性;而国企混改通过抑制经理人代理问题而降低费用粘性。

    Abstract:

    Based on the research samples of China's A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2017, this paper examines the relationship between mixed ownership reform, competitive strategy and cost stickiness of SOEs. The research finds that the SOEs with different strategic forms will show different cost behaviors. Compared with the cost leading strategy, SOEs implementing the differential strategy have higher cost stickiness; At the same time, it is found that the mixed ownership reform of SOEs can effectively restrain the stickiness of expenses, and its inhibiting effect is more obvious in the differential strategy; The analysis of the intermediary mechanism shows that compared with the state-owned enterprises implementing the cost leading strategy, the SOEs implementing the differential strategy will strengthen the cost stickiness by aggravating the agency problem of the management. However, the mixed ownership reform of SOEs will reduce the agency problem of management, thus inhibiting the stickiness of enterprise expenses.

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廖飞梅,万寿义,叶松勤.国企混改、竞争战略与费用粘性[J].审计与经济研究,2020,(4):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2020-08-29
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