Taking A share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as research samples, this paper finds that the presence of vertical interlocks of executives in state owned enterprises reduces audit fees, while the presence of vertical interlocks of executives in non state owned enterprises increases audit fees. After a series of endogeneity and robustness tests, the conclusion was still valid. The mechanism analysis shows that auditors can identify the “supervision effect” of vertical interlocks of executives in state owned enterprises, thus reducing the audit fees. It can also identify the dominant “tunneling effect” of vertical interlocks of executives in non state owned enterprises, thus increasing the audit fees. The moderating effect of internal and external governance factors can effectively reduce the auditors occupational risk. And auditors can identify the governance role of both equity checks and balances and external analysts in promoting vertical interlocks of executive supervision and restraining them tunneling, thus reducing audit fees.