Based on A share non financial listed firms in China from 2010 to 2019, this paper examines the effect of executive incentive mechanisms on audit pricing and audit delay. Empirical results indicate that: Different executive incentives have different impacts on audit pricing and audit delays. Executive compensation incentives are significantly positively correlated with audit pricing, but have no significant relationship with audit delays reflecting the degree of auditors efforts. The increase in audit pricing stems from the collection of risk premiums. Executive equity incentives have a significant negative relationship with audit pricing and audit delay. The decrease in audit pricing can be attributed to the reduction of both risk premiums and audit delay. Further research found that: the nature of state owned property rights reduces the audit risk caused by the negative effects of executive compensation incentives, easing the positive relationship between the executive compensation incentives and audit pricing by reducing the risk premiums, and equity incentives will not be charged for differentiated audit pricing strategies due to differences in the nature of property rights; listed companies that implement two incentive methods, the positive effect of equity incentives neutralize the negative effect of compensation incentives, the positive relationship between compensation incentives and audit pricing disappeared; the impact of executive compensation incentives on audit pricing strategies will not be significantly different due to the level of marketization, but equity incentives are the opposite.