Internal control evaluation is an important source of non financial information. However, there are differences on whether the internal control evaluation can effectively play a governance role. The most prominent problem is that the management has an obvious selective evaluation, which may aggravate the risk of stock price crash. Therefore, this paper empirically tests the relationship between the internal control evaluation, auditor supervision and the risk of stock price collapse by taking the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A share excluding ST and PT from 2007 to 2017, and objectively analyzes the internal control evaluation and its consequences based on the principle of substance over form. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1)the internal control evaluation report issued by listed companies will increase the risk of future stock price crash, and the issue of flawless internal control evaluation companies will be more obvious; (2)low information efficiency, high principal agent problem, high degree of inefficient investment and internal control evaluation report issued by non state owned listed companies have more significant impact on the risk of stock price crash; (3)the internal control evaluation report of listed companies will aggravate analysts divergence and increase the risk of stock price crash; (4)internal control audit supervision helps to alleviate the impact of internal control evaluation on the risk of stock price crash. Our conclusion is that the regulatory authorities should improve the evaluation system of internal control, strengthen the audit supervision of internal control of auditors, stakeholders should also correctly treat the defects of internal control, and create an institutional environment in which the management is willing to disclose and dare to disclose the defects of internal control.