审计全覆盖下国有企业出资人、内部审计与腐败治理——基于博弈模型的分析
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国家社会科学基金一般项目(18BJY049);中央高校基本业务费专项基金(21ZYJS009);北京社会科学基金青年项目(18BJ029)


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    摘要:

    反腐败工作一直是党和国家审计战略部署的重中之重,对我国的发展和稳定具有重要意义。在塞贝利斯(Tsebelis)模型的基础上分别建立只有内部审计的一级监督机制和出资人-内部审计的二级监督机制博弈模型,探讨什么样的机制设计和奖惩制度能更好地抑制腐败行为的发生,进而完善对国企经济责任人不敢腐、不能腐的监督治理体系。研究发现,一级监督机制下,内部审计部门工作人员容易偷懒从而纵容腐败的发生,所以在审计全覆盖要求下,有必要建立健全国企出资人对内部审计部门进行再审计的二级监督机制,并通过加大对内部审计人员的惩罚力度、适当调节出资人审计部门工作人员的奖励力度、减小对经济责任人腐败的惩罚力度,进而降低经济责任人腐败的概率。

    Abstract:

    Anti-corruption work has always been the top priority of the Party and national audit strategic deployment, which is of great significance to China's development and stability. Based on the Model of Tsebelis, the primary supervision mechanism of internal audit only and second level supervision mechanism on the basis of investor and internal audit are established, which is to explore what kind of mechanism, reward and punishment system can restrain the corruption, and then improve the economic responsibility of state-owned enterprises from daring not to corrupt to being unable to corrupt of supervision and management system. It was found that: under the primary supervision mechanism, the staff of internal audit departments is easy to be lazy and connived to corrupt. Therefore, under the requirement of full audit coverage, it is necessary to establish and improve the second-level supervision mechanism for state-owned enterprise investors to re-audit the internal audit departments. The probability of corruption of economic responsible persons can be reduced by increasing the punishment of internal auditors, appropriately adjusting the reward of the staff of the audit department of investors, and reducing the punishment of economic responsible persons.

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冯 婧,谭 超.审计全覆盖下国有企业出资人、内部审计与腐败治理——基于博弈模型的分析[J].审计与经济研究,2021,(6):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-11-26
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