Based on the evidence from interaction between listed companies and analysts, we explore the path that major shareholders'share pledge affects analysts' earnings forecasts from the two dimensions of the frequency of interaction and analysts' reputation. We found that:(1)the share pledge reduces the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts, and improves the optimism of earnings forecasts and the degree of divergence in earnings forecasts;(2)listed companies with share pledge affect their earnings forecasts through interaction with analysts;(3)peeling off the influence of reputation of interactive analysts, the share pledge directly affects analysts' earnings forecasts through the frequency of interaction with analysts;(4)the share pledges directly affect their earnings forecasts through the reputation of interactive analysts. Further research found that the higher the shareholding, the higher the share pledge rate, the closer expiration date, the more active the listed company, and the more holdings of fund companies will further aggravate the impact of share pledge on analyst earnings forecasts.