This paper studies the influence of shareholders' pledge of stocks on the adjustment of labor costs. The results show that: equity pledge significantly reinforces the labor cost stickiness；In the conflict between the theory of “agency view” and the theory of “efficiency view”, equity pledge strengthens the stickiness of labor costs by intensifying the agency problem between shareholders and management, while financing constraints have little effect on the stickiness of labor costs；Equity pledge mainly affects the stickiness of “price” in the labor cost, but has little influence on the stickiness of the number of employees;Equity pledge has a stickiness reinforcing effect on labor cost, which is significant only when the risk of control transfer is large, the competition in the banking industry is moderate, the shareholding ratio of shareholders is low and the information quality is poor;Equity pledge has a negative impact on the efficiency of labor cost adjustment, thus leading to the decline of the overall labor economic efficiency of the enterprise. This study enriches the literature on equity pledge and labor cost stickiness.