In the context of the STAR market allowing the listing of companies with dual class share structure and the strengthening of US regulation of Chinese companies listed in the US, this article takes the Chinese concept stock companies listed in the United States from 2005 to 2019 as a sample to empirically test the impact of dual class share structure on audit pricing and the environment in which it works. The empirical results find that dual class share structures significantly increase audit pricing compared to single equity structures; it also finds a significant positive relationship between the degree of separation between voting rights and cash flow rights and audit pricing under a dual class share structure. The above findings still hold true after controlling for endogeneity issues. Further research finds that the degree of separation between voting and cash flow rights has a more significant effect on audit pricing in dual shareholding structure companies with affiliated managers and located in less marketable regions than in other dual shareholding structure companies. These findings provide useful empirical references and theoretical guidance for the governance and regulation of dual class share structures.